Company Snapshot
After the first period of the Delivery Hero offer, 66.56% of shares and votes were attributed to the bidder, reducing acceptance risk. Settlement and synergies remain uncertain; company strength and price attractiveness are unchanged.
Prior assessment as of November 5, 2026:
Investment review as of 5 November 2026 following Q3 results released on 4 November. The assessment is authored by ChatGPT. Forecasts are conditional scenarios, not promised returns.
| Field | Current view |
|---|---|
| Company and ticker | Uber Technologies · NYSE: UBER |
| Sector | Digital mobility and delivery platforms |
| Thesis status | Conditionally positive |
| Confidence | Medium for the thesis; lower for a specific price range |
| Horizon | 3+ years; scenarios to 5 November 2029 |
| Reference price | USD 68.97 · November 17, 2026 · 14:52 EST / 20:52 CET · intraday |
| Company strength | 7.2/10; methodology 1.2, assessed 5 November 2026 |
| Price attractiveness | 7.0/10 at USD 69.87; methodology 1.2, assessed 5 November 2026 |
| Next results | Q4 2026; date not yet confirmed |
| Main opportunity | Growth in current services and autonomous-mobility distribution |
| Key risk | Losing the customer relationship and earning weak returns on AV capital |
Coverage is partial: official Q3 materials and a public transcript were checked; a new project transcript was unavailable.
November 17, 2026: Zoox moved from plans to live driverless rides on Uber in Las Vegas. The launch confirms an operating milestone; with utilization and margins undisclosed, both scores and scenario ranges are unchanged. Analysis and scenarios: ChatGPT.
Investment Thesis
Uber remains a growing and profitable platform. Autonomous vehicles can expand the market, but they also threaten its share of mobility economics. Shareholder outcomes depend on preserving the customer relationship, having several competitive AV partners and earning reasonable returns on capital.
- Q3 trips increased 16%, monthly active platform consumers 14%, and Gross Bookings 20% in constant currency.
- Adjusted EPS grew 35%; trailing-twelve-month FCF reached USD 10.4 billion.
- Mobility Gross Bookings slowed from 20% to 17% constant-currency growth. Management mainly linked this to driver supply and fuel prices in certain markets.
- Long-term scenarios remain unchanged: USD 110–130 base, USD 45–60 adverse and USD 150–190 very good.
What matters most: customer and transaction growth, EPS and FCF per share, Uber's share in mature AV cities, and returns on AV and acquisition commitments.
The Business
Mobility, ride ordering, and Delivery, food, groceries and retail, are central. Uber matches supply/demand; Uber One encourages cross-service usage. AV distribution/operating support serves different suppliers. Owners depend on transaction profit retained and capital required.
Gross Bookings is total platform transaction value, not Uber revenue. “Trips” includes rides and delivered orders.
Competitive Advantages
Density, brand, habits, distribution and large-scale coordination form the moat. Meaningful, but no customer lock-in: another app is easy to install; cheaper/faster arrivals attract users.
Uber aims to be a platform helping AV technologies win customers and operate commercially. AV developers need not build global demand, payments, support and operations themselves.
Uber Autonomous Solutions includes demand, data/mapping, funding support, insurance, fleet coordination and assistance — more than forwarding orders. Autonomous Solutions
| Advantage | Benefit | Weakens when |
|---|---|---|
| Existing demand | Customers for new fleets without building an app | Supplier has enough own demand |
| Hybrid network | Humans cover peaks, geography and limitations | AVs independently cover enough demand/capacity |
| Several partners | Less dependence and broader choice | Best cheap technology concentrates in one/two rivals |
| Operations | Dispatch, pickup points, support/utilization | Services become replaceable |
New Q3 evidence: management says partner AVs in the US average roughly 30% more trips per vehicle on Uber than on operators' own networks. This supports the value of distribution and utilization, but it is neither an independently verified like-for-like comparison nor proof of net profitability after all costs. The main advantage remains the combination of demand, a hybrid human-driver network and multiple AV suppliers; customers can still switch apps easily.
Growth Drivers
Four directions: affordability/underserved locations; frequency; business, reserved and specialized rides; groceries, retail and ads. Q1 management cited over 50 million Uber One members. Cross-service repeat usage helps, but cannot protect against a much cheaper or more available rival. Q1 transcript
Corporate catering could expand Delivery into larger, planned orders: the October 6 ezCater acquisition agreement supports this opportunity, but the transaction is not completed yet. Sur la Table kitchen equipment joined retail delivery October 8. No financial contribution was disclosed, so this partnership alone does not justify higher estimates or scores. ezCater, Sur la Table
TAM and car ownership
Growth remains without mass AV adoption. Q2 Mobility multiplied by four is roughly USD 116 billion annual Gross Bookings — a scale indicator, not TAM or forecast. More users, occasions and wallet share remain available.
AVs could move the market from occasional taxis to regular transport. All car spending is not future Uber revenue. Private/public transport and other platforms retain portions; cheaper rides can grow counts faster than dollar value.
Illustration: 10 million people shifting 200 yearly rides at USD 10 creates USD 20 billion spending; 50 million shifting 300 at USD 8 creates USD 120 billion. Not adoption forecasts through 2029. A 30% Uber share of the latter gives USD 36 billion Gross Bookings.
When not owning a car makes sense
the likely sequence: more individual rides, delaying a second car, then some car-free households. The final step needs low prices, peak availability and daily reliability.
Assume CZK 100,000 genuinely avoidable annual fixed costs and CZK 4/km variable costs, including depreciation, financing, insurance and parking. Not a specific vehicle's cost or current AV tariff.
At 12,000 km, CZK 15/km AV costs CZK 180,000 and does not replace the car financially; CZK 10/km does. This compares full costs when actually selling/not buying a car. Keeping a paid-off car makes marginal rides cheaper. Include waiting/time fees, route differences and other fares.
The economics of replacing a car depend on avoidable household fixed costs, annual mileage, service pricing, peak availability and reliability outside core service areas. Full replacement is hardest when carrying capacity and flexibility beyond the covered area are essential.
Waymo says 36% of San Francisco customers feel less dependent on their cars, not that 36% sold them. Waymo
Mass AV usage and Uber
Recurring rides, subscriptions and frequency could rise, but fleets must handle morning peaks. Empty repositioning increases traffic; cities can cap fleets or charge fees. Replacing public transport with individual robotaxis does not automatically save space.
Three outcomes: Uber is the main ordering point across fleets; shares with strong direct apps; or loses value and subsidizes distribution with capital. the long-term base is a mixed market with an important Uber role, not one-app monopoly. Through 2029, mainly city expansion/hybrid networks; broad car-ownership changes later.
3 November 2026 update: Delivery Hero reported Q3 GMV of EUR 13.93 billion, 13.6% LfL growth, revenue of EUR 4.35 billion, 22.0% LfL growth, and raised its 2026 outlook. This supports the target’s operating momentum but does not establish completion of the transaction or synergies for Uber. Rivian’s CEO also expressed confidence in meeting the autonomy milestone for the next USD 250 million tranche; this is partner-management commentary, not an achieved milestone or verified economics.
Q3 update: Uber One had approximately 55 million members. Management reported roughly 40% growth in Grocery & Retail, nearly 35% in premium products and nearly 50% in Uber for Business. These areas broaden growth without requiring mass AV deployment. The AV plan now emphasizes operation without a safety driver: approximately 700 vehicles by year-end 2026 and more than 2,000 by year-end 2027 are management targets, not achieved results.
On November 9, McDonald’s and Uber announced a multi-year expansion across 14 markets, including McDonald’s app orders delivered mainly via Uber Direct and links between loyalty benefits. After acquiring SpotHero, Uber also launched Uber Parking; the network covers over 13,000 lots and garages in more than 400 US and Canadian cities. Network coverage does not imply immediate availability in every city. The changes expand distribution without demonstrating incremental EPS.
On November 16 Uber and Zoox launched driverless rides on eligible routes in Las Vegas at no surcharge and announced a multi-year MGM Resorts partnership. Zoox keeps its app; Los Angeles is planned for 2027. Rides, utilization and Uber’s financial contribution have not been disclosed.
Economics & Financial Profile
Q3 revenue increased 10%, even though business-model changes, mainly in the UK, reduced reported revenue growth by roughly eight percentage points. Gross Bookings, trip growth and operating income are therefore more useful for operating comparisons.
At 30 September 2026, Uber reported USD 15.79 billion of debt, USD 10.07 billion of cash and short-term investments, and USD 2.07 billion of operating lease liabilities. The balance sheet predates completion of Delivery Hero and ezCater. Uber issued EUR 4.5 billion of euro notes in September, so the higher cash balance does not come only from operations.
Nine-month FCF was USD 7.61 billion, while stock-based compensation included in operating cash flow was USD 1.61 billion. Q3 diluted weighted-average shares declined about 3.5% year over year; repurchases were USD 750 million. An expected UK VAT payment of approximately USD 1.5 billion in Q4 will temporarily reduce cash and FCF.
A simple GAAP P/E is not sufficient: Q3 GAAP EPS of USD 0.25 includes investment remeasurement and other items. Adjusted EPS of USD 0.88 tracks ordinary operations better, but it is still not the same as cash available to shareholders.
At the November 17 intraday price of USD 68.97, indicative capitalization based on 2.05bn diluted shares is USD 141.5bn.
Key KPIs
| Metric | Q3 2026 | Year-over-year change |
|---|---|---|
| Monthly active platform consumers | 215 million | +14% |
| Trips | 4.061 billion | +16% |
| Gross Bookings | USD 59.819 billion | +20% reported and constant currency |
| Mobility Gross Bookings | USD 29.512 billion | +18% reported, +17% constant currency |
| Delivery Gross Bookings | USD 28.539 billion | +22% reported, +23% constant currency |
| Revenue | USD 14.766 billion | +10% |
| GAAP operating income | USD 1.447 billion | +30% |
| Non-GAAP operating income | USD 2.304 billion | +38% |
| Adjusted EPS | USD 0.88 | +35% |
| Free cash flow | USD 2.535 billion | +14% |
Volume growth slowed, but adjusted EPS growth did not. AV targets of 700 vehicles by year-end 2026 and more than 2,000 by year-end 2027 are management plans, not achieved results.
Management & Capital Allocation
ChatGPT’s assessment of the strategy is favorable, but final economics remain open. Uber is strongest with multiple competitive suppliers; weakest against a dominant low-cost, quality operator with its own strong app.
July's EUR 41.50/share Delivery Hero offer values the whole business at USD 14.8 billion. Acquired businesses in 50 markets had USD 42 billion 2025 Gross Bookings; SSW takes some others. Completion is expected in H2 2027 and remains conditional; the current acceptance period runs from August 27 through November 5, 2026. Uber plans cash and debt funding and expects adjusted-EPS accretion. The original committed EUR 14.2 billion bridge was reduced by EUR 4 billion on August 6, replaced with term-loan commitments. This is secured funding for a future transaction, not debt already drawn. Transaction announcement, offer timeline, financing 8-K
More customers/merchants and cross-selling are strategic benefits; financial value is after interest, integration and other costs. Bigger is not automatically more valuable per share. Model organic Uber separately from conditional acquisition contribution; neither USD 42 billion organic growth nor a facility treated as drawn debt.
ezCater — new capital allocation: On October 6, Uber announced an acquisition agreement for USD 2.3 billion in cash, with completion expected in the coming months subject to conditions. The company reports over 140,000 participating US restaurants, trailing-12-month Gross Bookings above USD 2.5 billion and high-teens year-over-year growth. It has positive Non-GAAP operating income; expected Delivery margin improvement is management's outlook, not an achieved result. The precise net contribution after financing, integration and stock compensation is insufficiently known, so scenarios add no ezCater profit but include a financing reserve. Another acquisition also competes for cash with Delivery Hero, AVs and buybacks. Official announcement
Rivian plans first deployment in 2028, initially 10,000 robotaxis exclusively through Uber. Up to 40,000 more is an option from 2030, not operating cars. Up to USD 1.25 billion Uber investment through 2031 is milestone-linked. Rivian/Uber
Capital intensity changes. Q2 management expected to take on over USD 10 billion in AV capital commitments over coming years; approximately 120,000 vehicles represent future partner commitments and plans. These include investments in companies, infrastructure and vehicle offtake. They are not cash already spent, ordinary annual CAPEX or a current fleet, but create financial risk. External funding can share burdens without guaranteeing Uber bears no economic commitments. August's new USD 7.7 billion revolving facility through August 2031 increases available liquidity; no loans were drawn at inception, only letters of credit transferred. This is not current cash. Q2 transcript, Q2 prepared remarks, 8-K
AV leadership transition: Sarfraz Maredia, global head of autonomous mobility and delivery, announced his departure effective November 16. He said day-to-day strategy will pass to Samarth Kejriwal and Aaron Emrich, with the next phase focused on scaling into more cities and increasing supply density. This creates execution risk at a key stage, but without demonstrated delay or weaker results it does not by itself reduce the management score. WSJ
Q3 update: capital allocation combines repurchases, acquisitions and long-term AV commitments. September euro notes increased funding capacity while also increasing fixed costs. Sarfraz Maredia, global head of autonomous mobility and delivery, announced his departure effective 16 November; day-to-day leadership is expected to pass to Samarth Kejriwal and Aaron Emrich. The transition creates execution risk at a key stage, but without evidence of delay it does not by itself change the management score.
According to the November 10 Eurex notice, 66.56% of Delivery Hero shares and votes were attributable to the bidder after the first acceptance period. This reduces acceptance risk. It does not establish settled ownership, regulatory approval, completion or synergies.
Risks / Bear Case
Lyft, Bolt, Grab, Didi and inDrive contest local supply/demand; DoorDash/regional platforms contest delivery. AV firms can also change production/distribution itself.
| Player | Supported cutoff status | Uber relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Waymo | October 8 announcement confirms September launch of the 15th US city; current website reports over 500,000 weekly autonomous rides without a precise measurement date | Supplier and direct app competitor |
| Tesla | July 22, 2026 update reports unsupervised expansion in six metropolitan areas, Bay Area with a safety driver; some launches occurred only in July | Vehicle/software/direct-distribution competitor |
| Wayve via Uber, London | September launch with licensed driver onboard | Partnership progress, different economics from driverless |
Waymo September, original Waymo volume reference, current Waymo figures, Waymo October, Tesla Q2, Wayve London. City counts do not imply full metro coverage, unlimited capacity or equal autonomy.
A funded AV competitor: On October 8, Waymo closed USD 5 billion debt financing, alongside USD 16 billion equity financing this year. This broadens its funding capacity for deployment and direct distribution. It is new evidence of competitor financial strength, not proof of robotaxi profitability or established deterioration in Uber results. Uber's share, earnings and cash-flow development in these markets determine the thesis. Waymo — official announcement
Waymo is a concrete threat, while partnering in Austin/Atlanta via Uber. Phoenix cooperation ended June 2026; Waymo success is not always Uber success. Via Uber, Reuters Phoenix
Tesla is beyond a promise. September NHTSA confirmed commercial driverless Cybercab in Austin and opened certification investigation: real operations plus regulatory uncertainty. FSD Supervised requires driver oversight, so sold Teslas are not ready-made robotaxi fleets. NHTSA, Tesla
Three-year pressure will be uneven: strong in selected cities, smaller elsewhere. Vehicles, permits, infrastructure, service and local reliability constrain scaling. Local success can hurt valuation before group results because future earnings position matters.
Market expansion and cannibalization coexist
Existing rides migrate to direct apps while new riders replace private-car trips or increase frequency.
YipitData's 268 early Waymo users in LA/SF/Phoenix increased total rideshare trips from 22.8 to 25.3, +11%, between H1 2025/2026. Their Uber rides fell similarly to controls. This supports category expansion, but a small self-selected active sample does not prove Uber cannot lose share. YipitData
Newly verified regulatory petition: On October 9, NHTSA opened DP26010, reviewing a petition received September 23 that alleges 2026 Model Y robotaxis and Cybercab vehicles exceeded speed limits in active school zones while ADS was engaged. The summary reports no crashes or injuries, and NHTSA is still deciding whether to grant the petition. This is not a proven defect or fleet-wide restriction; it illustrates uncertainty around the pace of AV scaling and does not by itself improve Uber economics. Primary NHTSA document
London legacy litigation — lower immediate legal risk, not a ruling on the merits: On October 19, the High Court dismissed two linked claims by black-cab drivers and former private-hire drivers, reportedly totaling about GBP 340 million, because they were filed outside the six-year limitation period. The court did not decide whether the original licensing allegations were true, and claimants are considering further options. The ruling reduces immediate exposure to these specific historical claims, but does not remove the separate UK tax dispute above GBP 1 billion or broader regulatory risk. Judgment, Reuters
New competitive context: DoorDash and Instacart announced a definitive agreement valued at approximately USD 17 billion. Reuters reported that Uber did not continue preliminary talks. This removes a possible additional capital requirement for Uber, but completion could strengthen DoorDash’s relationships with grocery chains; without completion and a quantified impact, the scenarios remain unchanged.
New Q3 risk: slower Mobility may be a temporary supply imbalance or an early sign of higher incentives and weaker availability. The October improvement remains a management claim. Waymo also closed USD 5 billion of debt financing, expanding its ability to build its own fleet and distribution; this does not prove profitability. Market expansion and cannibalization of Uber can occur at the same time.
Valuation
ChatGPT produces the calculations and valuation scenarios. Share-price inputs are dated to the analysis; they are not continuously updated market data.
Different outcomes. Different values.
68.97 USD · November 17, 2026 · 14:52 EST / 20:52 CET · intraday
Price attractiveness 7.0/10 at USD 68.97 (November 17, 2026; 14:52 EST / 20:52 CET · intraday). Three-year scenario returns: +59.5% to +88.5% in the base case and −34.8% to −13.0% in the adverse case.
Prior assessment as of November 5, 2026:
Nine-month adjusted EPS of USD 2.40 plus Q4 guidance of USD 0.95–0.99 implies roughly USD 3.35–3.39 for the year. At USD 68.97, this is approximately 20.5× the midpoint. The model conservatively retains a normalized USD 3.30 base.
| Assumption or output | Adverse | Base | Very good |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual existing-Uber Gross Bookings growth | 7% | 15% | 19% |
| 2029 adjusted EPS | USD 3.43 | USD 5.96–6.16 | USD 7.53 |
| Assumed P/E | 13–17× | 18.5–21× | 20–25× |
| Price in three years | USD 45–60 | USD 110–130 | USD 150–190 |
| Three-year dividends | USD 0 | USD 0 | USD 0 |
| Total return at USD 68.97 | −34.8% to −13.0% | +59.5% to +88.5% | +117.5% to +175.5% |
Price equals normalized 2029 EPS times the assumed P/E; these scenarios are neither consensus nor a full DCF. The base case requires continued operating leverage, roughly 1% annual net share reduction, and a positive Delivery Hero contribution after funding and integration. The adverse case assumes slower growth, pressure from direct AV apps and integration costs.
- Main weakness: 20% organic EPS growth and a positive net Delivery Hero contribution are not secured.
- Confidence: low; the quote and current results are verified, while three-year AV and integration economics are not.
- Condition for change: a higher score at a lower price with unchanged assumptions or demonstrated FCF-per-share growth; a lower score at a higher price without higher defensible EPS or with weaker operating economics.
Price history. The regular close preceding the assessment was USD 69.99 on November 16; it was not the model input.
What Would Change the Assessment?
| Area | Confirmation | Reassessment |
|---|---|---|
| Core demand | Double-digit transactions/customers, affordability | Several slowing quarters/higher incentives |
| Developed AV cities | Uber grows with category, quality supply | Share/profit lost faster than new demand |
| AV economics | Utilization improves profit/returns | More cars/commitments but weaker per-share cash |
| Partners | Several independent competitive suppliers | Best suppliers favor own distribution |
| Delivery Hero and ezCater | Profit after financing/integration | Size without EPS growth |
| Allocation | Lower net shares/manageable commitments | Buybacks only offset dilution; unproven investments |
Current View
After the first period of the Delivery Hero offer, 66.56% of shares and votes were attributed to the bidder, reducing acceptance risk. Settlement and synergies remain uncertain; company strength and price attractiveness are unchanged.
Prior assessment as of November 5, 2026:
Conditionally positive. Q3 confirmed volume and per-share earnings growth, while Mobility slowed and AV plus acquisitions increased capital demands. The thesis requires growth in ordinary services, quality AV partners and rising FCF per share after all commitments.
Company strength
7.2/10; assessed 5 November 2026, methodology 1.2.
| Area | Score | Main evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Competitive advantage | 7.0 | Scale, demand, brand and a hybrid network; customers can still switch apps easily. |
| Demand durability | 8.0 | Q3 trips +16%, consumers +14% and Gross Bookings +20% in constant currency. |
| Management execution | 7.0 | Adjusted EPS +35% and continued leverage; the AV transition and acquisition integration remain unproven. |
| Business economics | 8.0 | TTM FCF of USD 10.4 billion and growing EPS; incentives, SBC and acquisitions reduce cash available to shareholders. |
| Financial resilience | 6.0 | Strong cash generation, offset by higher debt and simultaneous Delivery Hero, ezCater and AV commitments. |
Calculation: (7 + 8 + 7 + 8 + 6) / 5 = 7.2. Share price does not enter company strength.
- Main weakness: easy app switching combined with a more capital-intensive AV strategy.
- Confidence: medium.
- Condition for change: higher with retained share in AV cities and FCF-per-share growth after integration; lower with sustained distribution loss, declining EPS or worsening liquidity.
Next evidence: Q4 should show whether Mobility improves without a lasting increase in incentives. For AV, actual driverless trips, fleet economics and Uber's share matter more than the number of announced partnerships.
Zoox moved from plans to live driverless rides on Uber in Las Vegas. The launch confirms an operating milestone; with utilization and margins undisclosed, both scores and scenario ranges are unchanged. Price attractiveness 7.0/10 at USD 68.97 (November 17, 2026; 14:52 EST / 20:52 CET · intraday). Three-year scenario returns: +59.5% to +88.5% in the base case and −34.8% to −13.0% in the adverse case. Company strength: 7.2/10.
Thesis History / Updates
| Date | Event or change | Thesis status |
|---|---|---|
| October 6, 2026 | Initial Q2 2026-based analysis: existing-service growth, AV strategy, capital commitments and conditional Delivery Hero contribution. Autumn-2029 base USD 110–130; then-reference USD 69.48, October 5 close. | Conditionally positive; earnings and cash flow per share decide. Standardized scores were not stated then. |
| October 6, 2026 | Converted to standard 13-section structure. | Investment conclusion and valuation scenarios retained. |
| October 10, 2026 | Partial review: added USD 2.3 billion ezCater agreement and USD 5 billion Waymo financing; clarified August Delivery Hero funding and future AV commitments. Quote and consensus recalculated; ezCater financing reserve added. | Thesis remains conditionally positive and USD 110–130 base range unchanged: news does not alter reported momentum, and a small EPS reserve does not change the rounded range. |
| October 10, 2026 | First methodology 1.0 assessment: Company strength 7.2/10, components 7 / 8 / 7 / 8 / 6; price attractiveness 7/10 at USD 71.51, October 9, 2026 close. Base three-year returns +53.8% to +81.8%, bear −37.1% to −16.1%. | Baseline assessment; the Page had no earlier common-methodology score, and none was backfilled. Business confidence medium, price confidence low. |
| October 13, 2026 | Methodology 1.1: company strength 7.2/10 and components 7.0 / 8.0 / 7.0 / 8.0 / 6.0; price attractiveness 7.0/10 at the USD 71.21 intraday quote. Added NHTSA petition review DP26010. | Scores and target-price ranges unchanged; base three-year return +54.5% to +82.6%, bear −36.8% to −15.7%. |
| October 20, 2026 | Methodology 1.2: company strength 7.2/10 and components unchanged; price attractiveness 7.0/10 at the USD 68.93 intraday quote at 15:04 EDT. Added the AV leadership transition and October 19 High Court ruling. | Scores and USD 110–130 base / USD 45–60 bear ranges remain unchanged. Base return +59.6% to +88.6%; bear −34.7% to −13.0%. New events do not yet change operating evidence. |
| 3 Nov 2026 | Added Delivery Hero’s reported Q3 data, Rivian’s autonomy-milestone commentary and the definitive DoorDash–Instacart agreement. Company strength remains 7.2/10 and price attractiveness remains 7.1/10 at USD 66.69. | The new evidence is currently balanced and does not change Uber’s economics or scenario ranges. |
| 5 November 2026 | Q3 results: trips +16%, consumers +14%, Gross Bookings +20% in constant currency, adjusted EPS +35%; Mobility slowed to +17%. Reference close USD 69.87. | Company strength 7.2/10, unchanged. Price attractiveness 7.0/10, down from 7.1 because of the higher entry price; scenario ranges of USD 45–60 / 110–130 / 150–190 remain unchanged. |
| November 17, 2026 | Zoox moved from plans to live driverless rides on Uber in Las Vegas. The launch confirms an operating milestone; with utilization and margins undisclosed, both scores and scenario ranges are unchanged. | Price attractiveness 7.0/10 at USD 68.97 (November 17, 2026; 14:52 EST / 20:52 CET · intraday). Three-year scenario returns: +59.5% to +88.5% in the base case and −34.8% to −13.0% in the adverse case. |
November 10, 2026: According to the November 10 Eurex notice, 66.56% of Delivery Hero shares and votes were attributable to the bidder after the first acceptance period. This reduces acceptance risk. It does not establish settled ownership, regulatory approval, completion or synergies. On November 9, McDonald’s and Uber announced a multi-year expansion across 14 markets, including McDonald’s app orders delivered mainly via Uber Direct and links between loyalty benefits. After acquiring SpotHero, Uber also launched Uber Parking; the network covers over 13,000 lots and garages in more than 400 US and Canadian cities. Network coverage does not imply immediate availability in every city. The changes expand distribution without demonstrating incremental EPS. Price attractiveness remains 7.0/10 at the intraday quote of USD 69.62 for NYSE UBER common stock on November 10, 2026, at 2:54 p.m. EST. The last session completed at the time closed at USD 71.17 on November 9; that close is not the model input. Assessed November 10 under methodology 1.2. Three-year base USD 110–130 (+58.0% to +86.7%), adverse USD 45–60 (−35.4% to −13.8%), with no dividends. Valuation confidence is low. Company strength remains 7.2/10.
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